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Abstract 
Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure 
payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending 
research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to 
communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than 
two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer mediated coalition game we 
show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main 
findings of three studies were that participants (1) form negative impressions of players who 
communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from 
obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that 
they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition 
with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, 
negotiations, and coalition formation. 
 
 
Key words: multiparty negotiation, coalition formation, emotions, anger, exclusion 
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Get Angry, Get Out: 
The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communications in Multiparty Negotiation 
Negotiation can be defined as a process in which two or more parties try to resolve a 
(perceived) divergence of interests by exchanging offers and counter offers (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 2003; Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). Interestingly, negotiation research 
tends to focus on situations in which only two people perceive divergent interest, ignoring 
small groups in which three or more individuals are in conflict. This lack of attention to 
multiparty negotiation is unfortunate because just introducing a third person to the 
negotiation table increases the complexity and social dynamics of the situation dramatically. 
When two individuals negotiate they may either reach an agreement or not. When three or 
more individuals negotiate, an agreement does not necessarily include all. Indeed, a major 
difference between bilateral and multilateral negotiations is that the latter allow the formation 
of coalitions.  
Early theorizing about coalition formation has its roots in game theory, assuming that 
individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest (for a review of this approach see e.g., 
Kahan & Rapoport, 1984; Komorita, 1984; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Murnighan, 1978a). In 
line with this assumption one of the most replicated findings is that individuals rather share 
payoffs with few others in a small coalition than with many others in a large coalition. More 
recent theorizing has taken a different approach to study coalition formation. In contrast to 
comparing the predictive outcome of various coalition theories to the actual outcome of a 
coalition game, this approach is more focused at the underlying process by varying structural 
aspects of the situation (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1998; Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 
2004a,b) and by stressing that individuals differ in what they value (Van Beest, Wilke, & Van 
Dijk, 2003; Van Beest, Van Dijk, De Dreu, & Wilke, 2005; Ten Velden, Beersma, & De 
Dreu, 2007). Adding to the assumption that people may be motivated by self-interest, this 
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line of research assumes that people are concerned how their actions affect the outcomes of 
those who are included and excluded from a deal (Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007).  
What is missing in both these coalition approaches is the observation of research on 
two-party bargaining (for reviews see Thompson, Medvec, Seiden & Kopelman, 2001;Van 
Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008) that behavior is not only shaped by 
self-interest and/or concern for others, but also by emotions, and specifically by anger 
(Allred, 1999) that may be experienced (e.g., Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1990) and communicated (e.g., Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; 
Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead 2004a, 2004b; Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). This neglect of emotions in coalition research is rather 
surprising because research on social exclusion has shown that being excluded is a very 
negative experience leading to anger and even retaliation (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Williams, 2007; 
Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), suggesting that the communication of anger should be 
an important factor in multiparty bargaining. To advance theorizing on coalition formation 
we therefore set out to study the interpersonal effects of anger communication in a three-party 
negotiation setting. 
Theoretical Background 
Our theoretical model is based on the social-functional account of emotions and its 
application in bilateral negotiations. The basic premise of this account is that emotions have 
important social functions and consequences (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 
1999; Morris & Ketlner, 2000; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Parkinson, 1996). For example, 
communicating anger may signal that someone’s behavior is undesirable and that adjustment 
is needed (Averill, 1982). Note that we focus on communicated emotions. We thus do not 
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investigate whether negotiators are truly angry, but rather how communicating anger affects 
the outcomes of those who use such a strategy.  
Demonstrating the pervasive effects of communicating anger, research on bilateral 
situations has on the one hand acknowledged that communicating anger has negative 
consequences. Individuals tend to form negative impressions of negotiators who 
communicate anger (Van Kleef et al., 2004a,b), may become angry themselves (Friedman et 
al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and may be unwilling to engage in future interactions with 
the opponent (Allred, 1997; Kopelman et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). However, 
regarding the financial consequences of communicating anger, this research has also stressed 
that communicating anger can have positive consequences. Provided that targets of anger 
communication do note have a high power position, several experiments have now shown 
that individuals yield to opponents who communicate anger, suggesting that communicating 
anger is a successful strategy to increase payoffs (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 
in press; Van Kleef et al., 2004a,b; but see Kopelman et al., 2006). For example, Van Kleef et 
al. (2004a) provided participants with information about the opponent's emotional state 
during a computer-mediated negotiation. Results showed that negotiators who were 
confronted with an opponent who communicated anger developed negative impressions of 
the opponent, but nonetheless conceded to the other's anger to avoid costly impasse.  
We concur that communicated anger is likely to trigger negative impressions in 
multiparty negotiations. Yet, we also argue that these negative impressions may have severe 
consequences because an alternative negotiation partner is highly salient. In multiparty 
bargaining, individuals do not have to reach an agreement with an angry opponent. They may 
reach an agreement with an alternative partner. Thus, the effectiveness of communicating 
anger hinges on whether or not individuals select an angry opponent to form a coalition. If 
negotiators form a coalition with an angry opponent he/she may benefit. However - and this 
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seems more likely - negotiators who communicate anger can be expected to be liked less, to 
be less likely to be included in a deal, and to obtain a smaller proportion of the payoffs.  
The Present Research 
We tested our model in three studies. In each study participants were led to believe that 
they negotiated with two other players in a three-player landowner game (Van Beest, Van 
Dijk, & Wilke, 2004b). The participants were endowed with a parcel of 4 acres and the other 
two players with a parcel of 3 acres, and informed that a project developer wanted to buy 2 
parcels for a prize of 70 thousand euros. This setup endowed the participant with a relatively 
large parcel but with equal opportunities to meet the demands of the project developer. This 
was done to create some tension between possible ways of allocating payoffs (Komorita & 
Chertkoff, 1973; Murnighan, 1991; Van Beest et al., 2004b) and thus some room for 
bargaining in which communications of anger would be credible. In addition, we explicitly 
informed participants that they could not form a grand coalition of three-players, but that the 
members of a two-player coalition could decide to allocate payoffs to an excluded player. 
This was done to address a minor issue in the coalition literature in which the decision to 
exclude a person from the coalition goes hand in hand with the decision to exclude that 
person from getting payoffs.  
A difference between our studies was that anger was communicated at different phases 
of the negotiation process. Coalition negotiations are complex. Some deals fail. Some 
succeed. Some are renegotiated. Consequently, different players may thus be potentially 
included and excluded from a coalition at different phases of the negotiation. Reflecting these 
differences we explicitly manipulated anger communications of both potentially included and 
excluded players across the three studies and reasoned that the effectiveness of their anger 
communication depends on the negotiation phase. In Study 1 anger was communicated via 
computer generated messages after a first attempt to form a coalition had failed. In this phase 
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of a negotiation process we hypothesized that it would be a risky strategy to communicate 
anger for players who are potentially excluded. In Study 2 and Study 3 anger was 
communicated directly after the first proposal of a participant. In this phase of a negotiation 
process we hypothesized that it would be a risky strategy to communicate anger for players 
who are potentially included. Another difference was that we varied the number of players 
who communicated anger. In Study 1 and Study 2 participants were confronted with only one 
potential coalition partner who communicated anger whereas in Study 3 both potential 
coalition partners communicated anger. On a conceptual level Study 3 mimics the standard 
two-player situation in that participants had to reach an agreement with an angry player. 
Study 1: The Potentially Excluded Player 
Study 1 focused on the negotiation phase in which a first attempt to form a coalition has 
failed. In this phase potential coalition partners need to decide whether they want to retry a 
failed coalition attempt or to switch coalition partner. Based on previous coalition research 
(e.g., Kahan & Helwig, 1971; Van Beest et al., 2004a) we reasoned that in the absence of 
anger communication participants would respond to a failed coalition attempt by trying to 
form a coalition with another player. But, what if participants are confronted with an angry 
message from the person who they excluded in the first round? Will participants still switch 
coalition partner or will they retry a coalition with the person who rejected their first 
proposal?  
Depending on experimental condition, participants received an angry message from the 
player who was included in the failed coalition attempt, from the player who was excluded 
from the failed coalition attempt, or from neither of the players. We expected participants to 
form negative impressions of those who communicate anger and that this would mediate their 
decision to switch partners. We thus expected participants to switch partner after a failed 
coalition attempt when not given any emotional feedback and when their potentially included 
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player communicated anger, but to stick with their original partner when the potentially 
excluded player communicated anger. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 120 psychology students from the University 
of Amsterdam (Mean age = 21.59, SD = 3.66; 87 women, 33 men) and assigned to either the 
included angry, excluded angry, or control condition. 
Procedure. Participants were seated at a computer in separate cubicles and told that 
they were participating in a three-player coalition game. In reality, the other players were 
preprogrammed computer players. We used a landowner paradigm to explain the coalition 
game. To increase a sense of entitlement, participants had to fill out a (bogus) landownership 
quiz to determine the relative size of each parcel. They learned that they were assigned to the 
position of player A and that they controlled a parcel of 4 acres whereas player B and player 
C controlled a parcel of 3 acres. Next, they were informed that a project developer pays 70 
thousand euros for 2 parcels, and explicitly told that this implied that any two-player coalition 
could meet the demand of the project developer. To make the game more engaging, 
participants were informed that their experimental pay would be based upon whatever they 
managed to obtain during bargaining. 
Following a negotiation procedure introduced by Komorita and Meek (1978), 
participants were informed that in each negotiation round all players would formulate an 
opening proposal stating with whom they wanted to form a coalition and how they wanted to 
allocate the payoffs. It was stressed that they could allocate payoffs to included and to 
excluded members of the proposed coalition. The proposals made by the preprogrammed 
computer players depended on the proposal of the participant. If the participant chose to form 
an AB-coalition, then B would propose a BC-coalition and C an AC-coalition. If the 
participant wanted to form an AC-coalition then B proposed an AB-coalition and C a BC-
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coalition. In these simulated proposals from player B and C the payoff was always divided 
equally among the coalition members (i.e., 35:35). These inductions ensured that each 
possible coalition was presented on the computer screen, and prevented that one of the 
computer players proposed the same coalition as the participant. 
After all proposals were made public, participants selected the proposal they wanted to 
execute. The choice of the computer players depended on the choice of the participant. If 
participants selected their own proposal, players B and C selected their own proposal. If 
participants selected the proposal of B then B selected the proposal of C, and C selected the 
proposal of A. If participants selected the proposal of C then C selected B and B selected A. 
This ensured that participants failed to form a coalition in the first round.  
Our anger manipulation was identical to the manipulation introduced by Van Kleef and 
colleagues. Participants were told that in each round the computer would randomly select a 
player to give a comment and that these comments would be made public to all players. In the 
included angry condition the computer always selected the player that was included in the 
failed coalition (e.g., player B if the participant wanted to form an AB-coalition). In the 
excluded angry condition the computer selected the player that was excluded in the failed 
coalition (e.g., player C if the participant wanted to form an AB-coalition in round 1). In the 
control condition participants learned that no one was given the opportunity to comment on 
the negotiation. The comment that participants received was (translated from Dutch): “The 
proposal of A pisses me off. It doesn’t make any sense”. This sentence has been extensively 
tested in previous research and is indeed perceived as an angry message (Van Kleef et al. 
2004a,b).1 
Next, participants entered the second round of negotiation. Again, participants were 
informed that all players had to formulate a proposal. Different than the first round, however, 
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we now preprogrammed the computer players such that they always selected the coalition 
proposal the participant wanted to execute. This ended the negotiation.  
Finally, we assessed impressions and checked the anger manipulation. Impressions 
were assessed by four questions about both the player that was included in the opening 
proposal of the participant (Cronbach’s  = .80) and the player that was excluded in the 
opening proposal of the participant ( = .91), (translated from Dutch: “How positive was your 
overall impression of player B/C”, “Was player B/C a nice person?”, “Was player B/C a 
friendly person?”, “Was player B/C a sympathetic person?”). The anger manipulation was 
checked by asking participants to indicate from whom they received an angry message (1 = 
from player B, 2 = from player C, 3 = from nobody). At the end of the experiment 
participants were thanked and debriefed. It was explained that their experimental pay would 
not be contingent upon bargaining performance because they had played against computer 
players and that they would get a flat fee of 6 euros. 
Results 
Eighty four percent of the participants remembered correctly whether and from whom 
they received a message (88% in the included angry condition, 88% in the excluded angry 
condition, 78% in the control condition, 2(2, n = 120) = 2.00, ns). Excluding participants 
who gave incorrect responses did not alter the pattern of the results and all participants were 
retained in the analyses reported below. 2 
Impressions. Oneway analyses of variance showed that our anger manipulation 
affected the impression of the potentially excluded player, F(2,117) = 33.01, p < .001, 2 = 
.36, and the potentially included player, F(2,117) = 16.21, p < .001, 2 = .22. As predicted, 
LSD comparisons showed that impressions of both the potentially included and potentially 
excluded players were least positive when they communicated anger (see Table 1). 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
COMMUNICATING ANGER IN MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION 11 
Partner selection. A Chi-square analysis revealed that participants switched partner 
more often in the control condition (80%) and included angry condition (80%), than in the 
excluded player angry condition (35%), 2(2, n = 120) = 23.74, p < .001. As predicted, it 
seems especially detrimental to communicate anger when one is excluded from a failed 
coalition attempt (see Table 2). 
Mediation analysis. Following Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003) we dummy 
coded two contrasts to describe our anger manipulation. The first contrast distinguished the 
included angry condition from the other two conditions. The second contrast distinguished 
the control condition from the other two conditions. Together they make the excluded player 
angry condition the referent group in the following regressions.  
Based on Baron and Kenny’s method (1986) to assess mediation, we conducted three 
sets of regression analyses. The first set of regressions showed that our anger manipulation 
predicted partner selection (included = .45, t = 4.65, p <. 001; control = .45, t = 4.65, p <. 001). 
The second set of regressions showed that our anger manipulation predicted our mediator, 
impressions of the potentially excluded players (included = .60, t = 7.05, p <. 001; control = .60, 
t = 7.03, p <. 001). The third set of regressions showed that the impressions of the potentially 
excluded players predicted partner selection ( = .37, t = 3.77, p <. 001), and showed that this 
reduced the effect of our anger manipulation on partner selection (includedl = .22, t = 2.05, p <. 
04; control = .220, t = 2.06, p <. 04). Sobel tests showed that this reduction was statistically 
significant for both the contrast that distinguished the included condition from the other two 
conditions (Zincluded = 2.93, p < .003) and the contrast that distinguished the control condition 
from the other two conditions (Zcontrol = 2.93, p < .003). This indicates that the effect of our 
anger manipulation on partner selection is partially mediated by impressions of potentially 
excluded coalition partners. 
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Payoff. Allocations are interdependent. What participants do not allocate to the other 
players is by definition allocated to the participant. We therefore restricted our analyses to 
payoffs that were allocated to both other players. A 3 (condition) x 2 (allocation: to 
potentially included player, to potentially excluded player) repeated measures analysis with 
allocation as within variable yielded an allocation effect, F(1,117) = 12.25, p = .001, 2 = .10, 
that was qualified by an interaction between allocation and condition, F(2,117) = 13.54, p = 
.001, 2 = .19. LSD comparisons showed that both the potentially included players and the 
potentially excluded player obtained fewer euros when they communicated anger than when 
they did not communicate anger (see Table 3). Extending the analysis of partner selection, 
this shows that players who communicate anger also suffer in terms of payoffs. 
The lucky few. To complete our analysis we assessed whether (and which) angry 
players may benefit on those rare occasions that they are included in the final coalition. For 
this post hoc analysis, we constructed a factor called Inclusion, consisting of two levels 
denoting whether or not angry players were eventually included in round 2. A 3(condition) x 
2(inclusion) ANOVA yielded a main effect of inclusion, F(1,114) = 2765.90, p < .001, 2 = 
.95. Not surprisingly, participants gave more to players who were included (M= 32.91, SD = 
4.16) in the final coalition than to players who were excluded in the final coalition (M= .22, 
SD = 1.37). The more interesting finding was that the analysis yielded condition effect, 
F(2,114) = 2.99, p < .05, 2 = .05, that was qualified by an interaction with inclusion, 
F(2,114) = 4.60, p < .03, 2 = .08. As can be seen in Table 4, this interaction effect is driven 
by differences in payoffs allocated to players who are included in the final coalition. 
Potentially excluded angry players who got included were given more euros than (a) 
potentially included angry players who remained included, and (b) even given more euros 
than potentially excluded players who did not communicate anger and got included.  
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Discussion 
In Study 1 we assessed how communicating anger affects coalition behavior when a 
first attempt to reach an agreement has failed. Results showed that participants form negative 
impressions of angry players and that these impressions mediated subsequent coalition 
behavior. Participants switched partners when players included in the failed attempt 
communicated anger, but stayed when players excluded in the failed attempt communicated 
anger. This supports our proposition that when negotiations fail it is especially detrimental to 
communicate anger for the players who were not included in the failed coalition attempt. 
After all, if these players would have suffered in silence, they would have been included in 
the next attempt. 
In agreement with results obtained in bilateral negations financial gains are possible for 
those few potentially excluded players who communicated anger, but were nevertheless 
included the in the final coalition. The current results show that these players were given 
more euros than potentially included players who communicated anger and remained 
included, and even more than potentially excluded players who did not communicate anger 
and got included. This shows that communicating anger is especially a risky gamble for 
excluded players of a failed coalition attempt. Their chances of being included in a coalition 
are strongly reduced when they communicate anger. But - consistent with prior research on 
two-party negotiation – on those rare occasions that participants choose to include them, they 
obtain high outcomes.  
Study 2: The Potentially Included Player 
To continue our analysis of how anger affects behavior in multiparty bargaining we 
focused on a different negotiation phase in Study 2. Different than Study 1, participants were 
now confronted with an angry message after their opening proposal but prior to any 
behavioral feedback of the other players. Depending on condition the included player of the 
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opening proposal, the excluded player of the opening proposal, or none communicated anger. 
This ensured that the communicated anger was only directed at the participants’ opening 
offer and not also in part a response to a failed coalition attempt. Directly after, participants 
were asked whether they wanted to alter their opening proposal.  
As in Study 1 we expected participants to form negative impressions of angry players, 
be less likely to include angry players in a final coalition, and allocate fewer euros to angry 
players than to non-emotional players. An important difference with Study 1 is that we now 
expected that communicating anger should be especially risky for potentially included 
coalition players. Stressing the negative consequence of communicating anger, it seems likely 
that in an ongoing negotiation potentially included players will remain included if they 
remain silent and do not communicate anger. Instead, by communicating anger, potentially 
included players run the risk of becoming excluded and obtaining fewer payoffs. Yet, 
stressing the beneficial aspects of pursuing a risky strategy, it also implies that now 
potentially included players who communicate anger should benefit if they remain included 
in the final coalition.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 81 students from Leiden University (15 
males, 66 females, Mean age = 19.38, SD = 1.93) and assigned to either the included angry, 
excluded angry, or control condition.  
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was based on the procedure of Study 1. The only 
difference was that we selected a different moment to introduce our anger manipulation and 
thus a slightly different negotiation procedure. Following a negotiation procedure introduced 
by Van Beest et al. (2004a) participants were informed that only one player would be given 
the opportunity to formulate an opening proposal in each round. They were told that the 
computer would randomly select a player, but we preprogrammed the computer that it would 
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always select the participant. In their opening proposal, participants were instructed to 
disclose with whom they wanted to form a coalition and how they wanted to allocate the 
payoffs. Subsequently, depending on condition, the included coalition player, the excluded 
coalition player, or nobody commented on the proposal. After this, participants could adjust 
their proposal. This was then sent to the other simulated players who were preprogrammed to 
accept it.  
Participants ended the experiment by filling out the small questionnaire assessing 
impressions (potentially included player,  = .92; potentially excluded player,  = .93) and 
whether participants understood from whom they got an angry message (1 = from player A, 2 
= from player B, 3 = from nobody). Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed and paid 6 
euros. 
Results 
Ninety four percent of all participants correctly remembered whether and from whom 
they received a message (96% in the included player angry condition, 93% in both the 
excluded player angry and the control condition; 2 < 1). Excluding participants who gave 
incorrect responses did not alter the pattern of the results and these participants were 
therefore retained in the analyses reported below. 2 
Impressions. Oneway analyses of variance showed that anger feedback affected 
impressions of both the potentially included, F(2,78) = 30.23, p < .001, 2 = .44, and 
potentially excluded players, F(2,78) = 18.69, p < .001, 2 = .32. As in Study 1, LSD 
comparisons showed that impressions of both the potentially included and potentially 
excluded players were least positive when they communicated anger (See Table 5).  
Partner selection. A Chi-square analysis revealed that participants switched partner 
more often in the included angry condition (70%) than in the excluded angry condition (30%) 
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and control condition (22%), 2(2, n = 81) = 15.03, p < .001. As predicted, it seems especially 
detrimental to communicate anger when one is included in an opening proposal (see Table 6). 
Mediation analysis. To capture our anger manipulation we again computed two 
contrasts. The first contrast distinguished the excluded condition from the other two 
conditions. The second distinguished the control condition from the other two conditions. 
Together they make the included angry condition the referent group in the following 
regressions. 
The first set of regressions showed that our anger manipulation affected partner 
selection (excluded = -.39, t = -3.31, p <. 001; control = -.46, t = -3.91, p <. 001). The second set 
of regression showed that our anger manipulations affected impressions of the potentially 
included players (excluded = .68, t = 6.98, p <. 000; control = .63, t = 6.45, p <. 000). The third 
set of regressions showed that impressions predicted partner selection ( = -.50, t = -3.96, p <. 
001), and that this reduced the effect of the anger manipulation on partner selection to non-
significance (excluded = -.05, t = -.37, p <. 71; control = -.15, t = -1.11, p <. 27). Sobel tests 
showed that this reduction was statistically significant for both contrasts (Zexcluded = 2.54, p < 
.01, and Zcontrol = 2.78, p < .005). As predicted, participants form negative impressions of 
potentially included players who communicate anger and this mediated their decision to 
continue forming a coalition with them. 
Payoff. A 3 (condition) x 2 (allocation: to potentially included player, to potentially 
excluded player) repeated measures analysis with allocation as within variable yielded only 
an interaction between allocation and condition, F(2,78) = 9.24, p = .001, 2 = .19. Further 
LSD comparisons to determine the nature of this interaction showed that (a) potentially 
included players obtain fewer euros in the included angry condition than the other two 
conditions, and (b) that potentially excluded players obtain more euros in the included angry 
condition than the other two conditions (see Table 7). 
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The lucky few. To assess whether (and which) angry players may benefit on those rare 
occasions that they are included in the final coalition we conducted a 3 (condition) x 2 
(inclusion) ANOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect of inclusion, F(1,81) = 658.92, p < 
.001, 2 = .90, showing that it is detrimental for one’s payoffs to be excluded (Min= 30.48, SD 
= 5.05 vs. Mex = 1.77, SD = 4.02). The more interesting finding is that the analysis yielded an 
interaction, F(2,81) = 3.21, p < .05, 2 = .08. As can be seen in Table 8, this effect is driven 
by players who were included in the final coalition: Potentially included angry players who 
remained included were given more euros than (a) potentially excluded angry players who 
got included, and (b) even more than potentially included players who did not communicate 
anger and remained included.  
Discussion 
In Study 2 participants were confronted with an angry message when they could still 
change their opening offer. Similar to Study 1, communicating anger backfired in the 
majority of cases. Participants formed negative impressions of angry players and decided to 
exclude them from the coalition, which in turn had a detrimental effect on their payoffs. 
Angry players obtained virtually nothing when excluded from a coalition.  
Stressing the timing of communicating anger, it was now especially a risky strategy for 
those players who were included in the opening offer of a participant. On those rare occasions 
that these players remained included in the final coalition, they obtained more euros than 
potentially included players who did not communicate anger, or potentially excluded players 
who did communicate anger. Consistent with Study 1, this again shows that those who are 
most likely to suffer from communicating anger are also those who can benefit most. 
Study 3: Nowhere to Run 
The previous two studies showed that participants form negative impressions of angry 
players and that they rather continue their negotiation with a player that does not 
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communicate anger. In contrast to two-party negotiations in which communicating anger may 
yield a concession from the other party we observed that participants rather form another 
coalition than yield to the angry player. However, consistent with two-party negation, we also 
observed that on those rare occasions that participants did decide to form a coalition with an 
angry player they seem to yield. In both Study 1 and Study 2, we observed that those who are 
most likely to suffer when communicating anger are also those who are most likely to benefit.  
In Study 3 we again asked participants to formulate an opening proposal, but also 
inserted a condition in which both the potentially included and potentially excluded player 
communicated anger. This ensured that participants could not walk away from anger by 
trying to negotiate with the other (non-angry) party. To reach an agreement, they now had to 
negotiate with an angry player. One a conceptual level this mimics the standard two-player 
situation of previous anger research in which participant need the angry opponent to reach an 
agreement. Consistent with the underlying argument that individuals want to avoid impasse 
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al. 2004a,b), and extending our finding that angry 
players may benefit when they are chosen to be included in a coalition, we predicted that 
participants would yield when they have to form a coalition with a player who communicates 
anger.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 84 students from Leiden University (Mean 
age = 20.5, SD = 3.0; 66 women, 18 men) and assigned to one either the included angry, 
excluded angry, or both angry condition.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2. After participants formulated an 
opening proposal they were presented with a message from either the potentially included 
player, the potentially excluded player, or both players. Unlike the previous two studies we 
used two messages to convey anger. These messages have been tested in previous research 
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and have found to be similar in strength (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). One message stated “This 
proposal makes me angry! It does not make any sense”. The other message stated “This 
proposal is outrageous. It pisses me off!”. In the included angry and the excluded angry 
conditions it was randomly determined by the computer which message was presented to the 
participant. In the both angry condition it was randomly determined which of these two 
messages was sent by the potentially included and which was sent by the potentially excluded 
player. Since there were no order effects, we dropped order from the analyses.  
Participants ended the experiment by filling out the small questionnaire assessing 
impressions of the potentially included player ( = .91), the potentially excluded player ( = 
.92), and whether participants understood from whom they got an angry message (1 = from 
player A, 2 = from player B, 3 = from both players). Different than the previous two studies 
we now made the game more engaging by informing participants that their bargaining 
performance would enable them to win a bonus of 50 euros. After participants were thanked, 
debriefed and paid a flat fee of 6 euros, we selected from each condition the participant who 
had obtained the most payoffs. These participants were given a bonus of 50 euros each.  
Results. 
76 out of 84 participants correctly remembered who communicated anger (86% in 
included player angry condition, 93% in the excluded player angry condition, 93% in the both 
angry condition, 2 < 1). Excluding participants who gave the wrong answer did not alter the 
results and these participants were therefore retained in the analyses reported below. 2 
Impressions. Oneway analyses showed that anger feedback had a similar impact on the 
impression of the potentially included player, F(2, 81) = 25.74, p < .001, 2 = .39, as on the 
impression of the potentially excluded player, F(2, 81) = 34.93, p < .001, 2 = .46. Similar to 
the previous two studies, LSD comparisons showed that participants formed less positive 
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impressions of potentially included players in the included player angry condition, and of 
potentially excluded players in the excluded player angry condition (see Table 9). 
Partner selection. A Chi-square analysis revealed that participants switched partners 
more often in the included player angry condition (80%) and the both angry condition (67%), 
than in the excluded player angry condition (21%), 2(2, N = 84) = 21.22, p < .001. Similar to 
the previous two studies, this shows that participants do not want to joint forces with players 
who communicate anger (see Table 10). The fact that participants also switched partner in the 
both angry condition is consistent with our reasoning that it is especially detrimental to 
communicate anger for potentially included players when negotiations have just begun.  
Mediation analysis. To capture our anger manipulation we again computed two 
contrasts. This first contrasts distinguished the included condition from the other two 
conditions. The second contrast distinguished the both angry condition from the other two 
conditions. Together they make the excluded player angry condition the referent group in the 
following regressions. 
The first set of regressions showed that the anger manipulation predicted partner 
selection (inlcuded = .55, t = 4.99, p <. 001; both = .42, t = 3.84, p <. 001). The second set of 
regressions showed that the anger manipulation affected impressions of the potentially 
included players (included = - .65, t = -6.50, p <. 001; both = -.59, t = -5.88, p <. 001). The 
third regression showed that these impressions predicted partner selection ( = -.50, t = -4.57, 
p < .001), and that this reduced the effect of the anger manipulation on partner selection to 
non-significance (inlcuded = .22, t = 1.84, p < .07; both = 1.08, t = 1.08, p <. 28). Sobel tests 
showed that this reduction was statistically significant for both contrasts (Zinlcuded = 3.37, p < 
.001, and Zboth = 2.94, p < .003). As predicted, participants form negative impressions of 
players who communicate anger and this mediated their decision to form a coalition with 
them. 
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Payoff. A 3(condition) x 2(allocation: to potentially included player, to potentially 
excluded player) repeated measures analysis was used to assess payoff allocations (See Table 
11). Replicating the results of the previous studies, this analysis yielded an interaction 
between allocation and condition, F(2,81) = 14.63, p = .000, 2 = .27. LSD comparisons to 
interpret this interaction showed that the potentially included players obtain fewer euros in 
the included player angry condition than in the other two conditions, and that the potentially 
excluded players obtain fewer euros in the excluded player angry condition than the other two 
conditions.  
Consistent with our hypothesis that participants will give themselves less payoffs when 
both other parties communicate anger, the results also yielded a main effect of condition, 
F(2,81) = 4.75, p = .001, 2 = .11. As predicted, LSD comparisons showed that participants 
allocated themselves fewer euros in the both angry condition than in the other two conditions.  
The lucky few. Finally, we assessed whether (and which) angry players may benefit if 
they are included in a coalition (see Table 12). A 3 x 2 ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
inclusion F(1,77) = 1054.25, p < .001, 2 = .92, showing that angry players are given more 
euros when included in the final coalition (M = 30.40, SD = 4.39) than when excluded from 
the final coalition (M = 1.05, SD = 3.37). It also yielded a main effect of condition, F(2,77) = 
8.06, p < .001, 2 = .17, which was qualified by an interaction of condition and exclusion, 
F(2,77) = 3.09, p < .05, 2 = .07. LSD comparisons showed that the potentially included 
angry players in the both angry condition who remained included obtained most euros. 
Consistent with the previous two studies, this shows that the player who is likely to suffer 
most, is also the player that benefits most from communicating anger. 
Discussion 
In Study 3 participants had to deal with a player who communicated anger. Based on 
our reasoning that communicating anger in multiparty negotiation backfires because 
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individuals can walk away, we reasoned that participants would yield to angry players when 
they cannot walk away. As predicted, participants gave themselves fewer euros when both 
players were angry than when one player was angry. Confidence in our findings is further 
increased by the fact that we used two different messages to convey anger. We did not find 
any order effects, showing that our results are not limited to one specific angry message. 
Similar to Study 2, it was again more risky for potentially included players than for 
potentially excluded players to communicate anger. On the one hand, the data on partner 
selection clearly showed that individuals did not want to continue a coalition with a 
potentially included player even when the potentially excluded player is also angry. On the 
other hand, the data on the lucky few showed that potentially included players who 
communicate anger get most when they remain included.  
General Discussion 
Results of three studies revealed that communicating anger has a profound impact on 
three-party negotiation. As predicted, anger backfires when individuals can walk away. In 
Study 1 participants adjusted their behavior when an initial attempt to form a coalition failed. 
Participants rather retry forming a coalition that has failed than start a new coalition with 
another party who communicates anger. In Study 2 participants adjusted their preference 
even when they did not know whether the other would have accepted their initial proposal. 
Individuals did not want to continue their attempt to form a coalition when their preferred 
player communicates anger. In Study 3, participants were confronted with two angry 
opponents. Extending the finding of Study 1 and 2 showing that the lucky few angry players 
who were included did benefit, participants yielded when they could not walk away.  
Another aspect of our studies is that we obtained our findings in a setting in which 
coalition membership did not automatically determine whether or not one could obtain 
payoffs. Following Thibaut and Kelley (1959) who defined a coalition as “two or more 
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persons who act jointly to affect the outcomes of one or more other persons” (p. 2005) and 
Van Beest and Van Dijk (2007) who noted that these other persons need not necessarily be 
coalition members, we separated these decisions and observed that both decisions are 
affected by our anger manipulation. Participants do not want to be in coalitions with angry 
players and they do not want to allocate payoffs to angry players.  
There are important differences between the three studies. In Study 1 communicating 
anger decreased the chances of potentially excluded players to get included. In Study 2 and 3 
communicating anger decreased the chances of potentially included players to remain 
included. Moreover, in Study 1 the effects of communicated anger on partner selection were 
mediated by impressions of potentially excluded players. In contrast, in Study 2 and 3 the 
effects were mediated by impressions of potentially included players. These differences 
between the studies highlight that timing is crucial. It shows that communicating anger is 
especially a risky strategy for excluded players when a first attempt to reach an agreement has 
failed, whereas communicating anger appears to be especially risky for included players 
when negotiations have just begun.  
Coalition Formation 
The current research is the first to assess the impact of anger communication on 
coalition bargaining. For long, social psychological theories on coalition formation were 
based on rational choice models predicting how people maximize their own payoffs in 
coalition formation (Komorita & Parks, 1995; Murnighan, 1978). Recently, research has 
taken a more motivational approach, stressing that coalition formation is also affected by 
fairness concerns (Van Beest et al., 2004a, b). We continued this shift in thinking by moving 
from “cold” rational or motivational approaches to “hot” emotional processes (Thompson, 
Nadler, Kim, 1999). In a situation in which rational choice models would predict that each 
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coalition should be equally likely, we showed that introducing a hot component predicts who 
gets included and how payoffs are allocated.  
A traditional finding in the coalition literature is that players are likely to exclude those 
providing many resources. This “strength is weakness” effect (Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957; 
Gamson, 1964; Komorita, 1984; Miller & Crandall, 1980; Murnighan, 1991) is based on the 
assumption that players do not want to join forces with potential partners who they assume 
will demand a large payoff share because it will lower their own outcome. Put differently, 
players assume that they are more likely to maximize their own outcome if they join forces 
with a weak partner than with a strong partner. In terms of the strength is weakness language 
it could thus be argued that we observed an “anger is weakness” effect. By communicating 
anger players decreased their chances of being included. Given that our findings were 
mediated by impressions – a variable that was not measured in previous coalition research – 
further research may test whether the traditional strength is weakness effect is in part also 
instigated by impressions. Regarding our anger is weakness effect further research may test 
whether impressions are based on the communicated anger and/or on the possible underlying 
message that those who communicate anger seem to expect a larger payoff share.  
Bilateral Negotiations 
Our findings can be compared with research on two-party negotiations that has 
documented beneficial effects of communicating anger (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van 
Kleef et al., 2004a, b, 2006). At first sight our findings are in sharp contrast with this 
statement. Yet, we want to stress that our findings are not in disagreement with the 
underlying reasoning. We too assumed that anger communicates a pressure to yield because 
participants want to avoid impasse. Consistent with this reasoning we observed that 
participants do yield when they chose to form a coalition with an angry player or when they 
were forced to form a coalition with an angry player. However, we also argued that 
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participants have other options to avoid impasse. Instead of yielding, individuals can select 
another partner to reach an agreement. Consistent with this argument we observed that the 
majority of the participants chose this route to deal with an angry opponent. They just 
avoided dealing with an angry counterpart and struck a deal with a non-angry player. On a 
more general level, we believe that our studies are a good example of how introducing an 
extra player to the negotiation table does indeed increase the complexity of the situation.  
Our work extends previous work on the moderating role of power in bilateral 
negotiations. By now a series of studies have demonstrated that relatively powerless 
individuals tend to concede in response to a counterpart's communicated anger, whereas 
relatively powerful negotiators tend to be impervious to their opponent's emotions (Sinaceur 
& Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b, 2006). In some of these experiments power was 
manipulated by providing participants with plenty (high power) or no (low power) alternative 
negotiation partners, based on the idea that having alternatives reduces one's dependence on 
the other party and therefore instills a sense of power (e.g., Pinkley, 1995; Thibaut & Gruder, 
1969). Interestingly, the present study shows that providing all the parties in the negotiation 
with a highly salient alternative negotiation partner has an even stronger moderating 
influence on the effects of anger communications in multiparty negotiation. In contrast to 
previous studies where the (un)availability of alternatives was found to switch the beneficial 
effects of anger on or off, the present data indicate that having a salient and easily accessible 
alternative coalition partner may actually turn the effects of anger around, and produce 
detrimental instead of less beneficial effects. 
A concern that may be raised is that we focused on three-player games in which each 
coalition yielded the same payoffs and each player had an equal number of alternatives to 
form a coalition. A possible next step would thus be to introduce power asymmetries in a 
coalition setting. For example, some players could be given more opportunities to form 
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alternative coalitions than others, or some coalition could provide better payoffs than others. 
This would allow a further understanding of coalition dynamics by testing whether players 
will maximize their payoffs by forming minimal coalitions in terms of power (e.g., Gamson, 
1961) when anger is communicated by those who are needed to maximize one’s outcomes. 
We showed that participants will actively exclude those who communicate anger in a 
situation in which players are equal in power. Introducing power asymmetries may establish 
some boundary conditions by testing whether negotiators will also actively exclude those 
who communicate anger when such players are more critical than others to attain good 
payoffs.  
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Footnotes 
1
  We tested the angry message in a coalition scenario (N = 40). Participants read a 
scenario in which they had made an offer to a player who then responded with the angry 
message or not. Next, we asked participants to evaluate the emotional disposition of the 
opponent. Not surprisingly and consistent with the results obtained in bilateral negotiation, 
participants believed that the opponent was more angry when they received the angry 
message than when they did not receive a message.  
2
  As expected most participants demanded more than an equal share of the payoffs in 
their opening offer (76% in Study 1, 82% in Study 2, 85% in Study 3). Yet, a critic may 
argue that a considerable number of participants made an offer in which they gave an equal 
share to their coalition partner after which it may be less credible to receive an angry message 
from their opponent. To test whether this affected our results, we reran all analyses with this 
allocation preference as a covariate in each of the three studies, and conducted specific 
analyses excluding participants who demanded equality in their opening offer. Both these 
analyses yielded identical findings as an analysis including all participants. We therefore 
decided to use all participants in the reported analyses and are confident that the results on 
impressions, partner selection and final payoff allocation cannot be explained by differences 
in allocation preference and credibility of our anger manipulation.  
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Table 1 
Impressions of fellow players in Study 1 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Potentially included player 3.01a 1.11 4.31b 1.14 4.23b 0.88 
Potentially excluded player 4.68b 0.82 3.16a 1.11 4.68b 0.92 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison.  
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Table 2 
Partner selection in Study 1 (frequencies) 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Potentially included player 8 26 8 
Potentially excluded player 32 14 32 
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Table 3 
Means and standard deviations of final payoff allocation in Study 1 
 Included Angry 
Condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Self 37.4 3.8 35.4 3.7 36.4 3.6 
Potentially included player 6.53a 12.72 22.43b 16.98 7.50a 13.93 
Potentially excluded player 26.10b 13.39 12.18a 16.90 26.10b 13.58 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison. 
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations of payoffs as a function of condition and partner selection in 
Study 1  
 Included Angry 
Condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Angry in 30.75a 6.78 34.79b 3.14 32.62a 3.51 
Angry out 0.47 1.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.31 
 
Note. Angry in = payoffs obtained by included angry players. Angry out = payoffs obtained 
by excluded angry players. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < 
.05 in the LSD comparison. 
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Table 5 
Impressions of fellow players in Study 2 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Potentially included player 3.01a  (1.12) 4.94b  (1.25) 4.79b  (0.73) 
Potentially excluded player 4.96b  (1.02) 3.27a  (1.35) 4.47b  (0.62) 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison. Higher numbers imply more positive impressions. 
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Table 6 
Partner selection in Study 2 (frequencies) 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
Potentially included player 8 19 21 
Potentially excluded player 19 8 6 
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Table 7 
Means and standard deviations of final payoff allocation in Study 2 
 Included Angry 
Condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Self 37.00 4.90 39.60 6.50 39.40 4.7 
Potentially included player 10.56a 15.29 20.33b 13.42 24.07b 12.85 
Potentially excluded player 22.41b 13.31 10.04a 13.01 6.52a 12.13 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison. 
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Table 8 
Means and standard deviations of payoffs as a function of condition and partner selection in 
Study 2  
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Control 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Angry in 33.12b  (3.87) 27.87a  (7.29) 30.47a  (4.08) 
Angry out 1.05  (3.15) 2.52  (4.79) 1.66  (4.08) 
 
Note. Angry in = payoffs obtained by included angry players. Angry out = payoffs obtained 
by excluded angry players. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < 
.05 in the LSD comparison. 
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Table 9 
Impressions of other players in Study 3 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Both Angry 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Potentially included player 2.83a 1.08 4.66b 0.74 2.98a 1.29 
Potentially excluded player 5.25c 0.69 3.14a 0.98 3.76b 1.21 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison. 
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Table 10 
Partner selection in Study 3 (frequencies)  
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Both Angry 
condition 
Potentially included player 6 22 9 
Potentially excluded player 23 6 18 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard deviations of final payoff allocation in Study 3 
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Both Angry 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Self 39.8b 6.2 41.5b 7.7 36.6a 3.1 
Potentially included player 5.24a 11.40 22.04c 12.44 12.63b 15.62 
Potentially excluded player 24.93b 11.18 6.46a 11.17 20.78b 14.93 
 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the LSD 
comparison. 
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Table 12 
Means and standard deviations of payoffs as a function of condition and partner selection in 
Study 3  
 Included Angry 
condition 
Excluded Angry 
condition 
Both Angry 
condition 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Angry in 30.33a,b 4.76 26.83a 3.76 33.33b 2.50 
Angry out .22a 1.04 .91a,b 2.51 2.28b 5.46 
 
Note. Angry in = payoffs obtained by included angry players. Angry out = payoffs obtained 
by excluded angry players. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < 
.05 in the LSD comparison. 
